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Colantonio: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW
I.

PROPORTIONALITY

State v. Buck, 314 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 1984).
During the survey period, the West Virginia Supreme Court examined proportionality of sentencing of criminal defendants. The court defined four factors which
trial courts should use to determine when a sentence is disproportionate to the
offense.' In State v. Buck,' the supreme court held that a sentence of seventy-five
years for aggravated robbery was unconstitutional in light of the four factors. Buck
and a co-defendant, James Richards, robbed a store of $1,210.00. While the robbery was in progress, one of the co-defendants struck the cashier in the head. Both
men were subsequently apprehended. Richards pleaded guilty to a reduced charge
of grand larceny and was sentenced to one year in jail, while Buck, convicted of
aggravated robbery, was sentenced to seventy-five years. On appeal, Buck contended that his seventy-five year sentence was disproportionate to the offense committed. The supreme court remanded and directed the trial court to exercise its
sentencing discretion but the trial court reaffirmed the seventy-five year sentence.
The defendant again appealed. On second appeal, the supreme court formulated
four major considerations which trial courts should use in sentencing.
The first consideration reiterated the eleven points enumerated in State v.
Houston3 which included:
1) the moral character of the offender; 2) his mentality; 3) his habits; 4) his social
environment; 5) his abnormal or subnormal tendencies; 6) his age; 7) his natural
inclination or aversion to commit crime; 8) the stimuli which motivate his conduct;
9) conditions surrounding the defendant's family life; 10) prior criminal records;
and 11) whether the defendant expressed remorse for his offense."
The second factor required the court to compare the defendant's sentence with
those imposed for related offenses.' The court noted the defendant received a much
more severe sentence than he could have received for a more serious crime. For
example, if Buck had killed the cashier instead of wounding him he could have
been eligible for parole in a much shorter time period. The third consideration

' W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5 provides in pertinent part: "Penalties shall be proportioned to

the character and degree of the offense."
2 State v. Buck, 314 S.E.2d 406 (f. Va. 1984).
State v. Houston, 273 S.E.2d 375 (,V. Va. 1980). In Houston, defendants were convicted of
robbery by violence and they appealed their respective sentences of 30 years and 40 years. The supreme
court reversed, and announced guidelines to determine whether a sentence was disproportionate to the
offense committed.
4 Buck, 314 S.E.2d at 408.
Id. (citing Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205, 210 (W. Va. 1981) and Martin v.
Leverette, 244 S.E.2d 39, 43 (f. Va. 1978)).
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compared punishment imposed in other states for the same offense. The court noted
that Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania have set maximum sentences
below seventy-five years for aggravated robbery. 6 The last consideration viewed
the disparity of sentences between co-defendants, as discussed in State v. Cooper.'
The court in Cooper had noted that if defendants are similarly situated, some courts
will reverse on disparity of sentence alone.8
In reviewing these considerations, the supreme court after commenting that
Buck had never been convicted of a violent crime, found no justification for the
disparity of sentences between the co-defendants. Thus Buck's sentence was found
to be unconstitutionally disproportionate to his offense and the case was remanded
again to the circuit court for sentencing consistent with the guidelines presented
in the opinion.
II.

DOUBLE JEoPARDY

State v. Collins, No. 15767 (W. Va. Jan. 27, 1984).
In an opinion involving a robbery of more than one victim, the supreme court
clarified and defined how double jeopardy principles affect multiple charges growing out of the same offense.9 Collins, along with a co-defendant, attempted to rob
a Charleston area grocery store. During the attempt, Collins shot and wounded
one of the store's employees. He was tried and convicted on all three counts of
an indictment which charged him with attempted armed robbery of two employees
and the malicious wounding of one of them. On appeal, the defendant argued the
trial court erred in refusing to quash his indictment, since two of the counts grew
out of a single transaction-the armed robbery.
Initially the court noted the confused state of the doctrine of double jeopardy.' 0
Justice Neely, writing for the majority, commented that the court had never previously examined the issue of double jeopardy in the context of robberies which
affect multiple victims." The court began its analysis by examining the common
2
law offense of robbery and the legislative intent behind the current robbery statute.'

6 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 515.020, 532.060(2)(b) (Baldwin 1975) (ten to twenty years); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 488 (1982) (twenty years); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2911.01, 2929.11 (1982)
(twenty-five years); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1103(1), 3701 (Purdon 1983) (twenty years).
State v. Cooper, 304 S.E.2d 851 (W. Va. 1983).
Id. at 856.
State v. Collins, No. 15767, slip op. (W. Va. Jan. 27, 1984).
10Id. at 5 (citing Burke v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1977)).
" For a procedural discussion on charges relating to the same offense, see State ex rel. Watson
v. Ferguson, 274 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1980).
" W. VA. CODE § 61-2-12 (1977), states as follows:
If any person commit, or attempt to commit, robbery by partial strangulation or suffocation,
or by striking or beating, or by other violence to the person, or by the threat or presenting
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The court determined the common law crime of robbery was primarily designed
to protect individuals from being endangered. The court then examined the current
robbery statute to determine whether it had modified the common law. It observed
the robbery statute is included in the chapter that defines crimes against the person, rather than in the section that defines crimes against property. While the statute
does not provide a definition of the crime of robbery, it does define attempt and
actual commission of robbery as equivalent offenses.' 3 Based on this analysis, the
court determined the intent of the legislature, in codifying the offense of robbery,
was to protect individuals from bodily and emotional terror. Therefore the court
concluded the number of crimes committed depended on the number of persons
placed in fear.' 4
In a lengthy discussion the court pointed to opposing opinions in case law from
other jurisdictions, however these results were attributed to statutory schemes with
different public policy objectives.' 5 The West Virginia Legislature has spoken with
clarity that an attempt to commit robbery is the same offense as the actual completion of a robbery. Additionally, the court found that in order for a robbery to
occur two elements must co-exist: First, a person must be placed in fear; and second,
property must be taken that was in their possession or under their control.' 6 The
court noted that in this case, although Collins had not taken property from both
his victims, he had attempted to do so, and thus his multiple conviction was entirely
proper.' 7

of firearms, or other deadly weapon or instrumentality whatsoever, he shall be guilty of a
felony, and, upon conviction, shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than ten years.
If any person commit, or attempt to commit, a robbery in any other mode or by any other
means, except as provided for in the succeeding paragraph of this section, he shall be guilty
of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than five
nor more than eighteen years.
If any person (a) by force and violence, or by putting in fear, feloniously takes, or
feloniously attempts to take, from the person or presence of another any property or money
or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management or
possession of, any bank, he shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than ten nor more than twenty years; and if any person
(b), in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in the preceding class
(a) of this paragraph, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by
the use of a dangerous weapon or device, he shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than ten years nor more than twenty-five years.
,1Collins, No. 15767, slip op. at 8-9. This view is in accord with the Model Penal Code and
at least twenty other states which include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Texas.
Collins, No. 15767, slip op. at 20.
" Id.
at 14-17.
16 Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
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BURDEN OF PROOF

State v. Kopa, 311 S.E.2d 412 (W. Va. 1983).
A.

Overruling the "Alexander Instruction."

In State v. Kopa,8 the supreme court reluctantly agreed with the Fourth Circuit that an alibi instruction which places the burden of persuasion on the defendant unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof. Previously, in State v.
Alexander, 9 the court had determined a defendant's alibi was an affirmative defense.
Thus it was not improper for a trial court to instruct a jury that the defendant
had a burden to prove his alibi defense sufficiently to create a reasonable doubt
in the minds of the jury.
In Kopa, the victim, Edna Karver, was found slain in her home. An autopsy
revealed that she had died from a series of six stab wounds. Kopa and two

co-defendants were arrested and indicted for first degree murder and felony murder.
The trials of the three were severed, and Kopa was convicted of felony murder.
During the trial, Kopa used an alibi defense. Various witnesses testified that he
and the co-defendants were in a local bar for most of the evening when the murder
took place. On appeal, Kopa claimed one of the trial court's instructions relating
to the defense of alibi unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof. 20
In reversing Kopa's conviction, the supreme court reluctantly complied with
the mandate of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Adkins v. Bordenkircher,2
which invalidated the Alexander instruction.22 The Adkins decision criticized the
characterization of alibi as an affirmative defense,2 3 stating that it unconstitutionally
shifted the burden of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt
2
from the prosecution to the defendant. 1
"

"
20

State v. Kopa, 311 S.E.2d 412 (W.Va. 1983).
State v. Alexander, 245 S.E.2d 633 (W.Va. 1978).
The instruction was substantially identical in form to the one approved in State v. Alexander,

and read as follows:
The Court instructs the jury that where the State of West Virginia has established a prima
facie case and the defendant relies upon the defense of alibi, the burden is upon the defendant to prove it, not beyond a reasonable doubt, nor by a preponderance of the evidence,
but by such evidence, and to such a degree of certainty, as will, when the whole evidence
is considered, create and leave in the mind of the jury a reasonable doubt as to the guilt
of the defendant.
Kopa, 311 S.E.2d at 417.
23 Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853 (1982).
22 Adkins was decided approximately two weeks after Kopa had been convicted.
23 West Virginia, along with a minority of jurisdictions, places an alibi in the category of an
affirmative defense. Kopa, 311 S.E.2d at 417, n.2 (citing e.g., Doshier v. State, 623 P.2d 242 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1981); Harkness v. State, 267 Ark. 274, 590 S.W.2d 277 (Ark. 1979)). See also 22 C.J.S.
CriminalLaw§40 (Cum. Supp. 1983); 22A C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 574 (Cum. Supp. 1983). The Adkins
court opined that this was contrary to the definition of an affirmative defense as set forth in Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). Id. at 417.
24 Id.
The Adkins court found this contrary to the burden of proof doctrine set out in Mullaney
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals disagreed with this reasoning,
arguing that the instruction did not relieve the prosecution from proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, nor did it shift the burden of
proof to the defendant. 25 However, the court noted the problem that would arise
if the state court sustained convictions on an alibi instruction with certain release
available through habeas corpus in the federal court. To forestall such a result
the West Virginia court agreed with the Fourth Circuit and found that the Kopa
of proof to the defendant, and
instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden
26
overruled State v. Alexander on that point.
B.

Retroactivity of Kopa

The invalidation of the Alexander instruction in Kopa presented the court with27
the practical problem of whether its decision should be given full retroactive effect.
In deciding retroactivity, the court relied on Bowman v. Leverette,28 which addressed
2 9
the retroactive effect of decisions invalidating instructions at criminal trials.
The threshold consideration of the Bowman analysis is a determination of
whether the questionable instruction should be given full retroactive effect under
the guidelines enunciated in Mullaney v. Wilbur.3 0 In Bowman, the court made
several distinctions between the type of instruction invalidated in Mullaney and
the one invalidated in Bowman. First, the Bowman instruction did not have detailed
recitation of facts, unlike the Mullaney instruction; 3' second, in Mullaney, the burden
of proof was explicitly shifted to the defendant whereas in Bowman, it was not;32
and third, the Bowman instruction did not create a conclusive presumption as did
Mullaney.33 Since the invalidated instruction was dissimilar to the Mullaney instruction, the Bowman court reasoned that it would not have full retroactive effect.

v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
25 Although alibi has long been characterized as an affirmative defense in West Virginia the
prosecution has always had the burden of proving every element of the charge beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 422 (citing I H. LEE Tim CRmINAL TRIuAL IN THE VmNmIAs §§ 357 & 369 (2d. ed. 1940).
Kopa, 311 S.E.2d at 418.
, Full retroactive effect was defined in State v. Gangwer, 283 S.E.2d 839 (W.Va. 1981) (syllabus
point two) which stated: "The concept of 'full retroactivity' in a criminal case ordinarily means that
the new rule is available not only for those cases in litigation or on appeal where point has been preserved but is also available by way of collateral attack on final judgment through a writ of habeas
corpus." Id. at 840.
21 Bowman v. Leverette, 289 S.E.2d 435 (W.Va. 1982).
29 Instructions similar to the one used in Bowman had been struck down by the United States
Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), and by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in State v. O'Connell, 256 S.E.2d 429 (1979), therefore the issue for resolution in
Bowman was whether to give the Sandstrom and O'Connell holdings full retroactive application.
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
SI

Bowman, 289 S.E.2d at 441.

Id.
" Id. at 442.
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1985
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Bowman set forth a three-pronged test to determine whether an invalidated
instruction would be given full retroactive effect.3 4 The first prong of the test, known
as the "major purpose rule," has three aspects: 1) the major purpose of the new
rule must be 2) to correct a flaw that substantially impairs the truth-finding function of trial and 3) thereby raises serious questions about the reliability of past
verdicts. The second prong of the test considers the reliance placed upon the old
doctrine. The third prong considers the effect on the administration of justice of
a retroactive application of the new rule. The court noted that all three aspects
of the first prong must be satisfied before there is a need to apply the second two
3
prongs to the test. .
In applying this test, the court found that the Kopa instruction was
distinguishable from the instruction overruled in Mullaney and similar to the
instruction struck down in Bowman.36 The Kopa instruction did not have a detailed
recitation of the facts and there was no explicit shifting of the burden of proving
each element of the crime from the prosecution to the defendant. Thus, the court
was not bound by Mullaney and it applied the principles of Bowman to deny retroactive application of Kopa. The court found that using the Alexander instruction
did not impair the truth-finding function of trial. Also, the opinion noted that
because this state has used the Alexander instruction since before the turn of the
century, courts would be unable to determine whether the giving of such an
instruction was harmless error. 3 7 Therefore, the court held that the invalidation
of the Alexander instruction would not be given full retroactive effect and was
only applicable to those cases currently in litigation or on appeal where error had
been properly preserved at trial.
IV.

A.

INSTRUCTIONS

Lesser Offenses

State v. Wyer, No. 15839 (W. Va. Mar. 21, 1984).
In State v. Wyer, 31 the court examined West Virginia's sexual assault statutes3
to determine whether a defendant is entitled to jury instructions which include lesser
" The three-pronged test applied in Bowman was first used by the United States Supreme Court
in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
Kopa, 311 S.E.2d at 420-21 (citing Bowman, 289 S.E.2d at 444-45).
3' Id. at 420.
Id. at 421-22.
' State v. Wyer, No. 15839, slip op. (W.Va. Mar. 21, 1984).
' W.VA. CODE § 61-8B-3 (1977), reads as follows:
(a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when:
(1) He engages in sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion; and
(i) He inflicts serious bodily injury upon anyone; or
(ii) He employed a deadly weapon in commission of the crime; or
(iii) The victim was not a voluntary social companion of the actor on the occasion
of the crime; or
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offenses. The defendant had entered his neighbor's house with a stocking over his
head and a knife in his hand. He approached the victim and directed her to the
bedroom where she performed oral sex on the defendant. The defendant claimed
that the victim consented to the acts and at trial his defense counsel requested an
instruction on the lesser included sexual offenses. The trial court refused and the
0
jury found the defendant guilty of sexual assault in the first degree."
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision based on the
principles set forth in State v. Neider.4 ' In Neider, the court applied a two-part
test to determine whether a defendant is entitled to instructions pertaining to lesser
offenses. The first part of the inquiry focused on whether the charge inherently
contained a lesser included offense. ' 2 The second part of the analysis required a
factual determination of whether there was evidence to contradict the evidence of
the elements of the greater offense which were different from the elements of the
43
lesser included offense.

In Wyer, the court determined first degree sexual assault did not inherently
contain a lesser offense.44 It observed that that the legislature had created a distinction between the elements of proof required for a conviction of first and second
degree sexual assault by differentiating between a voluntary and nonvoluntary social
45
companion. The court noted that this view is in accord with other jurisdictions
and the Model Penal Code.4 6 The court then determined that under the first degree
sexual assault statute the state need only prove the victim was a nonvoluntary social
(2) He engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is incapable of consent because he is physically helpless; or
(3) He, being fourteen years old or more, engages in sexual intercourse with another
person who is incapable of consent because he is less than eleven years old.
(b) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a felony,
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned not less than ten or more than twenty
years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars and imprisoned in the penitentiary not
less than ten nor more than twenty years.
W.VA. CODE § 61-8B-4 (1977), reads as follows:
(a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when:
(1) He engages in sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion; or
(2) By forcible compulsion, he causes penetration, however slight, of the female
sex organ or of the anus of any person, by any inanimate object for the purpose of gratifying
the sexual desire of either party.
(b) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a felony,
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than five nor
more than ten years, or fined nor more than ten thousand dollars and imprisoned in the
penitentiary not less than five nor more than ten years.
" Wyer, No. 15839, slip op. at 1-2.
4" State v. Neider, 295 S.E.2d 902 (V.Va.
1982).
42

Id. at 904.

1S Id. at 905.
" Wyer, No. 15839, slip op. (V.Va. Mar. 21, 1984).
41 Id. at 8 (citing State v. Grover, 460 A.2d 581 (Mo. 1983), Tyre v. State, 412 A.2d 326 (Del. 1980)).
46

Id. at 10. See

MODEL PENAL CODE,

Art. 213.1 (1962).
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companion and the victim was subjected to sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion. However, where a voluntary social companion is the victim, the defendant
is guilty of second degree sexual assault, unless the state, in addition, can show
either the infliction of serious bodily injury or the use of a deadly weapon in the
commission of the crime.4 7 Therefore, the court held that the only instance in which
an instruction on a lesser included offense could be given is when the victim is
a voluntary social companion and there are no aggravating circumstances. Since
Wyer's victim was not a voluntary social companion, the court held that he was
not entitled to an instruction which included a lesser offense."8
It should be noted that subsequent to this decision, the legislature amended
the sexual assault statute.' 9 Under the new statute, sexual assault in the first degree
requires sexual assault with serious bodily injury or use of a deadly weapon. 0 No
longer can the prosecutor obtain a conviction of sexual assault in the first degree,
solely because the victim was a nonvoluntary social companion. Thus, under the
new statute, it is now more difficult to convict a defendant of sexual assault in
the first degree, so that sexual assault in the second degree will be the primary
focus of future convictions.
B.

Mercy

State v. Kopa, 311 S.E.2d 412 (W. Va. 1983).

In State v. Kopa,5 the question was whether the trial court erred when it
Wyer, No. 15839, slip op. at 10.
I1 at 11-12.
Id.
' W.VA. CODE § 61-8B-3 (Supp. 1984) reads as follows:
(a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when:
(1) Such person engages in sexual intercourse or sexual intrusion with another person and, in so doing:
(i) Inflicts serious bodily injury upon anyone; or
(ii) Employs a deadly weapon in the commission of the act; or
(2) Such person, being fourteen years old or more, engages in sexual intercourse
of sexual intrusion with another person who is eleven years old or less.
(b) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a felony,
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than fifteen
nor more than twenty-five years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars and imprisoned
in the penitentiary not less than fifteen nor more than twenty-five years.
W.VA. CODE § 61-8B-4 (Supp. 1984) reads as follows:
(a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the second degree when:
(1) Such person engages in sexual intercourse or sexual intrusion with another person without the person's consent, and the lack of consent results from forcible compulsion; or
(2) Such person engages in sexual intercourse or sexual intrusion with another person who is physically helpless.
(b) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a felony,
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than ten nor
more than than twenty years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars and imprisoned
in the penitentiary not less than ten nor more than twenty years.
47

50 Id.
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instructed the jury it could return the following verdicts: first degree murder, first
degree murder with the recommendation of mercy, or not guilty. The defendant
contended the instruction of first degree murder with a recommendation of mercy
offered the jury a compromise verdict in violation of West Virginia Code section
62-3-15.11 The defendant requested a bifurcated trial where the jury could consider
mercy only after it had found the defendant guilt of murder. 3
The supreme court found this contention to be without merit under the principles of Leach v. Hamilton,54 in which the court approved the unitary trial procedure. The supreme court also relied on the mandatory requirement that a trial
court instruct the jury that it may add a recommendation of mercy to a first degree
murder verdict. 5 Applying these principles in Kopa, the court found it mandatory
for a trial court to instruct the jury that it may add a recommendation of mercy
to a verdict of first degree murder. The duty exists over the objection of the defenthe consedant unless it affirmatively appears that the defendant fully understands
56
quences of his request to have such an instruction omitted.
V.

RIGHT

To

COUNSEL

State v. Wyer, No. 15839 (W. Va. Mar. 21, 1984).
In State v. Wyer, 1 the supreme court considered whether a defendant's written
waiver of Mirandarights5 8 will suffice to waive his sixth amendment right to counsel
once the defendant has been arrested, brought before a magistrate, and has requested

counsel.5 9

Wyer signed a form requesting counsel when he appeared before the magistrate.
His confession was obtained the following day. At the suppression hearing, the
officer who took the confession testified that he advised the defendant of his Miranda

52 W.VA. CODE § 62-3-15 (1977), provides that if a person is found guilty by a jury of first degree
murder he shall be sentenced to life imprisonment in the penitentiary without a possibility of parole.
"
However, the statute further provides "that the jury may, in their discretion, recommend mercy ...
11Kopa, 311 S.E.2d at 422.
14 Leach v. Hamilton, 280 S.E.2d 62 (V. Va. 1980).
11Kopa, 311 S.E.2d at 422 (citing State v. Lindsey, 233 S.E.2d 734 (W. Va. 1977) (syllabus point
three)). See also State v. Loveless, 139 W. Va. 454, 80 S.E.2d 442 (1954) (syllabus point three).
16 Id. at 422-23.
5" Wyer, No. 15839 (V. Va. Mar. 21, 1984).
" In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) the Supreme Court determined that the fifth and
fourteenth amendments' prohibition against compelled self-incrimination required that custodial interrogation be preceded by advice to the defendant that he has the right to remain silent and also the
right to the presence of an attorney. The court also indicated the procedures to be followed subsequent
to the warnings.
"9U.S. CONsT. amend. V reads as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
to be twice
same offense
for the
be subject
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rights, but the defendant voluntarily executed a written waiver of those rights.60
While there was some question raised at the suppression hearing as to whether the
defendant had been properly represented by counsel at the time his confession was
taken, the matter was not developed by the defendant's trial counsel. The defendant contended that his trial counsel was ineffective since, he failed to argue at
the suppression hearing that the defendant's confession was taken in violation of
his sixth amendment right to counsel."
The supreme court noted that the primary purpose of the Miranda warning
was to protect the accused's fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination,
whereas the sixth amendment protects a defendant's right to counsel. The court

cited Brewer v. Williams,6 which distinguished Miranda rights from those rights

granted by the sixth amendment.6 3 The court continued its analysis by enunciating

the guidelines established in State v. Gravely64 which established when a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel attaches. The Gravely court had relied

heavily on Kirby v. Illinois,6 which held that a defendant's sixth amendment right
to counsel attaches when adversarial judicial proceedings have been initiated against

him. 66 Thus the court found sixth amendment rights attached when Wyer was
arrested, initially brought before the magistrate, and requested counsel.61
Having determined that Wyer's sixth amendment rights attached when he gave

his confession, the court then addressed the issue of whether the defendant had
waived these rights. Recognizing that the Supreme Court in Kirby had not defined

specifically how and when a defendant waives his right to counsel, the court looked
to Brewer v. Williams," which recognized that sixth amendment rights could be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor to be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
U.S. CoNST. amend. VI reads as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense.
60Wyer, No. 15839, slip op. at 13.
63 Id. at 13.
62 Brewer v.

Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
Id. at 397-98.
64 State v. Gravely, 299 S.E.2d 375 (1982).
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
66 In Kirby, the Supreme Court stated this could be initiated by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. Id. at 689.
67 Wyer, No. 15839, slip op. at 16.
65 Brewer, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
63
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waived.6 9 Relying on the reasoning of Brewer, the court70 concluded that there was
no per se rule against waiver of the right to counsel.
In the final part of its analysis, the court concluded a waiver of sixth amendment right to counsel should be judged by stricter standards than those of the fifth
amendment. 7' The court reasoned that a defendant's willingness to waive his right
to counsel, prior to the institution of an adversarial procedure, may produce positive
benefits by giving a defendant a better opportunity to cooperate with officials and
avoid any legal entanglement. Once formal proceedings have begun, however, the
government commits the full weight of its prosecutorial forces against the defendant, and requires him to stand against those forces unassisted. This is markedly
unfair unless there is a showing that a knowing and intelligent waiver of his sixth
amendment right to counsel has occurred. 7 The court cited several decisions from
other jurisdictions which suggested the same rationale.73 Consequently, it held that:
1) The sixth amendment right to counsel, once attached, can only be waived by
a written waiver signed by the defendant;
2) It must be shown, in addition to the customary Miranda warnings, that at the
time the waiver is executed, the defendant was aware that he was under arrest and

had been informed of the nature of the charge against him;
3) If at the time the waiver is sought, the defendant indicates his desire to have
counsel at interrogation, that interrogation must cease until counsel is made available

to him, unless the defendant initiates further communication with the74 police evidencing his desire to waive such sixth amendment rights to counsel.
It should be noted however, in a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Harshbarger
criticized the majority's holding and advocated adopting a per se rule against waiver
of sixth amendment right to counsel. This rule would require all interrogation to
cease once a defendant has requested counsel orally or in writing. Right to counsel
could only be waived by a defendant after notice to counsel and upon his counsel's
75
advice.

69 The court in Brewer stated: "The court of appeals did not hold, nor do we, that under the
circumstances of this case Williams could not, without notice to counsel, have waived his rights under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. It only held, as do we, that he did not." Id. at 405 (emphasis
in original).
" Wyer, No. 15839, slip op. at 23.
71 Id.

71 Id. at 20-21.
71 Id. (citing Kirby, 406 U.S. 682; United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980); and People v. Cunningham, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 49
N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360 (1980)).
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 15-16 (Harshbarger, J., dissenting).
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PROSECUTOR'S DuTY To PROSECUTE

State ex rel. Hamstead v. Dostert, 313 S.E.2d 409 (W. Va. 1984).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in State ex rel. Hamstead v.
Dostert,76 discussed at length the distinction between prosecutorial duty and
prosecutorial discretion in seeking indictments. The court held that the line between
duty and discretion is determined by the probable cause standard.
The case centered around a question of what charges should be brought where
a death resulted from a domestic quarrel. When Judge Dostert learned that the
prosecuting attorney, Mr. Hamstead, was seeking a grand jury indictment for
involuntary manslaughter, he ordered the prosecutor to bring a murder charge.
Hamstead indicated, based on the investigating officer's report and all available
evidence, a charge of murder should not be sought and that he considered the mat7
ter solely within his discretion as a prosecutor.
The judge impanelled a grand jury and instructed them to consider only a
murder indictment and no lesser offenses. Hamstead informed the grand jury of
the potential problem with evidence and asked them to determine if they desired
a continuance from Judge Dostert."1 After deliberating for a period of time, the
grand jury requested that the court reporter read Judge Dostert's instructions once
again. Upon hearing this request, the judge entered an Order in Mandamus directing the prosecutor to show cause why he should not immediately commence presenting evidence. Hamstead did not obey the mandamus, responding that the grand
jury had not requested to hear any formal presentation, but desired to review the
court's instructions. Judge Dostert ordered the prosecutor jailed until he was willing to obey the mandamus order. Hamstead subsequently filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus" and a writ to prohibit the Judge from interfering with the grand
jury process.
The supreme court recognized that the duty to prosecute is found in both the
West Virginia Constitution"0 and the West Virginia Code section 7-4-1 .1t
The court
cited Skinner v. Dostert,82 in asserting that a prosecutor has discretion in the exer-

" State ex rel. Hamstead v. Dostert, 313 S.E.2d 409 (W. Va. 1984).
7 Id. at 412.
71

Id.

at 413.

79 Id.
'o

W. VA. CoNsr. art. IX, § 1, reads in pertinent part: "The legislature . . . shall prescribe,

by general laws, the terms of office, powers, duties and compensation of all public officers ..
" W. VA. CODE § 7-4-1 (1984) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney to attend to the criminal business of the
State in the county in which he is elected and qualified, and when he has information of
the violation of any penal law committed within such county, he shall institute and prosecute
all necessary and proper proceedings against the offender, and may in such case issue or
cause to be issued a summons for any witness he may deem material.
11 Skinner v. Dostert, 278 S.E.2d 624 ffV. Va. 1981) (the prosecuting attorney is vested with discre- 12
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cise of his duties, but noted that this discretion is somewhat restricted by West
Virginia Code section 7-4-1.11 The court noted that the word "shall" in this statute
affords a mandatory connotation, and discretion envisions a course of conduct
that is "necessary and proper" in a particular case. What is necessary and proper,
the court stated, "is necessarily represented by the probable cause standard."
Therefore the line between prosecutorial duty and discretion is represented by
whether, in a prosecutor's professional judgment, there is probable cause to believe
an offense has been committed. 3 This discretion is subject to certain limitations
including the prohibition against overcharging to induce guilty pleas. 4
Following these guidelines, the court determined the Judge had interfered with
the prosecutor's role, and that he wrongfully interfered with prosecutorial discretion when he attempted to usurp the power of the grand jury."5 The court granted
the prosecutor's requests for writs of habeas corpus and prohibition. Also, the court
suggested that a private citizen, by writ of mandamus, could compel a prosecutor
to act upon probable cause because a citizen has the right to compel a prosecutor
to perform nondiscretionary duties." The majority's determination that prosecutorial
discretion is subject to judicial oversight, prompted Justice Neely, in a spirited dissent, to assail the shortcomings of this holding.
Although Neely agreed that Judge Dostert interfered with the prosecutor's discretion, he strongly disagreed that there was a mandatory requirement that a prosecutor
indict in all cases where he believes that there is probable cause to do so. The dissent opined that by its very nature the exercise of discretion cannot be reduced
to a formula.' 7 Where serious crimes have been committed, broad prosecutorial
discretion is critical because prosecutors may not wish to indict in a particular circumstance. The prosecutor may believe that the suspect would be more useful as
a witness against others or he may be aware of a possible federal indictment that
would carry a stiffer penalty." The dissent also characterized the majority opinion
as clearly wrong to suggest that a citizen can compel a prosecutor to indict a
suspected criminal when that citizen believes probable cause exists.' 9 This would
burden the courts in criminal proceedings with the responsibility of "listening to
unfounded charges from every self-appointed guardian of the public interest."' 90
tion in the control of criminal causes, which is committed to him for the public good and for the
vindication of the public interest). Id. at 631.
11Hamstead, 313 S.E.2d at 415.
14 Id. at 416 (citing Standard 3-3.9(e) of THE AmmmcAN BA AssocuATnoN STANDARDS FoR CRumNAL
JUSTICE (1980)).
, Id. at 417.

Generally, a citizen has the right to compel a public official to perform a nondiscretionary
duty. Id. at 415 (citing The West Virginia Housing Dev. Fund v. Copenhaver, 153 W. Va. 636, 171
S.E.2d 545 (1969); Greenbrier County Airport Auth. v. Hanna, 151 W. Va. 479, 153 S.E.2d 284 (1967)).
17 Hamstead, 313 S.E.2d at 421 (citing A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 84).
Id. at 421-22.
85

"

Id.

90 Id.

at 425.
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JUVENMEs

PreadjudicatoryDetention

State ex rel. M.C.H. and S.A.H. v. Kinder, No. 16203 (W. Va. May 9, 1984).
In State ex reL M.C.H. and S.A.H. v. Kinder," the supreme court was asked
to set standards regarding the preadjudicatory detention of juveniles who have committed acts which would be crimes if they were adults. Two juveniles, ages seven
and nine years, were arrested on a delinquency charge of breaking and entering
and were taken to the police station for interrogation. The boys had been apprehended inside their school with approximately twelve dollars worth of money, toys,
and candy in their possession. They were taken before a magistrate and ordered
detained in secure confinement after they were unable to post the $5,000 bond set
for each of them.2 The children spent four days at the Kanawha Home for Children
before counsel procured their release to their mother's custody." Upon original
jurisdiction to the supreme court, the boys' counsel argued that they should not
have been committed to a prison-like facility because of their age, and the magistrate
should not have conditioned their release on the posting of $5,000 bond for each. 94
The supreme court noted that the underlying purpose of the juvenile code
expresses a clear preference for allowing parents to retain custody of their children."
Relying on the statute, the court set a standard for determining when a child should
be kept in secure detention. The court concluded seven factors should be considered
in this determination:
1) the seriousness of the offense charged; 2) the likelihood of flight, or conversely
stated, the probability of his appearance; 3) his prior juvenile record and regularity

of appearances; 4) whether under all of the circumstances, he poses a substantial
danger to himself or to the community; 5) his age, maturity, and general health;
6) his family background and the family's willingness to supervise his behavior;
and 7) the availability of alternative sources of placement, short a secure detention
facility, if the family is unavailable, unfit, or unwilling to exercise control over
the child.' 6

In addition to these factors, the court stated "as a matter of common sense, the
young children should not be placed in secure detention except in the most extraordinary cases."' 97 The court noted that the juvenile statutes prohibit post-conviction
State ex rel. M.C.H. and S.A.H. v. Kinder, 317 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1984).
at 151-52.
91Id. at 152. The court characterized the Kanawha Home for Children as a "spartan like setting."
14 Id. at 158-59.
" W. VA. CODE § 49-5A-2 (1980) provides in pertinent part: "Unless the circumstances of the
case otherwise require, taking into account the welfare of the child as well as the interest of society,
such child shall be released forthwith into the custody of his parent or parents, relative, custodian
or other responsible adult or agency."
96 Kinder, 317 S.E.2d at 157.
"

92 Id.

97 Id.
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incarceration of juveniles under the age of ten for males and under the age of
twelve for females.9" But, the court also held that in extraordinary cases, where

the offense is serious and there are no other alternatives bail may be appropriate
because the facts of the case did not justify detention, the court determined both
juveniles were unlawfully detained, and the imposition of $5,000 bail was
unwarranted. 99
B.

Right To Counsel
Although the petitioner in State ex rel. M.C.H. and S.A.H. v. Kinder did not

raise the issue of a juvenile's right to counsel at a detention hearing, the supreme
court addressed the issue. The court noted that West Virginia Code section 49-5-1boo

conferred the right to counsel at all stages of any proceeding. This statute, when
read in pari materia with West Virginia Code section 49-5-21'" and West Virginia
Code section 49-5-8,102 granted the child the right to counsel at a detention hearing.
1, Id. (citing W. VA.
& Supp. 1984)).
"

CODE

§ 28-1-2(a) (1980 & Supp. 1984) and W. VA.

CODE

§ 28-3-2 (1980

Id. at 159.

v. VA. CODE § 49-5-1 (1980 & Supp. 1984) provides in pertinent part:
The child shall have the right to be effectively represented by counsel at all stages of proceedings under the provisions of this article. If the child, parent or custodian executes an
affidavit showing that he cannot pay for an attorney appointed by the court or referee, the
Court shall appoint counsel, to be paid as provided for in article twenty-one [§ 29-21-1, et
seq], chapter twenty-nine of this Code.
,'' W. VA. CODE § 49-5-2 (1980) provides in pertinent part:
A child may be brought before the circuit court for proceedings under this article by the
following means and no others:
(a) By juvenile petition praying that the child be adjudged neglected or delinquent;
(b) Certification or transfer to the juvenile jurisdiction of the circuit court, from the criminal
jurisdiction of such court, from any foreign court or any court of this State before which
such child is brought charged with the commission of a crime, as provided in section one,
one-a or one-b [§ 49-5-1, 49-5-la or 49-5-1b] of this article;
(c) By warrant, capias or attachment issued by a judge, referee or magistrate returnable to
the circuit court, charging a child with an act of delinquency.
ZOO W. VA. CODE § 49-5-8 (1980 & Supp. 1984) provides in pertinent part:
A child in custody must immediately be taken before a referee or judge of the circuit court
and in no event shall a delay exceed the next succeeding judicial day: Provided, that if there
be no judge or referee then available in the county, then such child shall be taken immediately before any magistrate in the county for the sole purpose of holding a detention hearing.
The judge, referee or magistrate shall inform the child of his right to remain silent, that
any statement may be used against him and of his right to counsel, and no interrogation
shall be made without the presence of a parent or counsel. If the child or his parent, guardian
or custodian has not retained counsel, counsel shall be appointed as soon as practicable.
The referee, judge, or magistrate shall hear testimony concerning the circumstances for taking the child into custody and the possible need for detention in accordance with section
two [§ 49-5A-2], article five-A of this chapter. The sole mandatory issue at the detention
hearing shall be whether the child shall be detained pending further court proceedings. The
court shall, if advisable, and if the health, safety and welfare of the child will not be endangered thereby, release the child on recognizance to his parents, custodians or an appropriate
0
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Prior to Kinder, there had been some confusion surrounding this issue because
of the holdings in Arbogast v. R.B.C."°3 and Kearns v. Fox.0 " In Arbogast, it
was held that a juvenile had no right to counsel at a detention hearing occurring
after he had been taken into custody on a warrant, where no juvenile petition had
been filed. The absence of a petition meant that formal proceedings had not yet
begun. The Arbogast court relied on Kearns, which held that a juvenile proceeding
was initiated only after the filing of a juvenile petition. Subsequently, in Kinder,
the supreme court indicated that a juvenile proceeding could be initiated by an
arrest warrant'15 and overruled Kearns and Arbogast to the extent that they suggested the right to counsel was not available for a juvenile at a detention hearing.
Kinder clarifies that juveniles have a right to counsel at their detention hearing.",
VIII.

ARREST POWERS

State v. Boggess, 309 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1983).
The supreme court, in State v. Boggess,"'7 defined a conservation officer's scope
of authority in making arrests and executing search warrants when an offense is
committed in his presence. Ransom was a conservation officer with the West Virginia
Department of Natural Resources. During a routine patrol, he spotted an automobile
parked in an area commonly used for dumping garbage. Ransom walked past the
automobile and observed two men standing upon a concrete pad covered by a large
sheet of plastic which contained approximately seventeen pounds of marijuana.'"
Ransom placed the two men under arrest and transported them to a magistrate's
office. He then obtained a search warrant and upon searching the defendant's car,
discovered a large bag of marijuana. The men were subsequently tried and found
guilty of possessing marijuana with intent to deliver." °9
On appeal, the defendant contended that Ransom's authority as a conservation officer was limited to matters concerning the West Virginia Department of
Natural Resources and he had no authority to execute a search warrant relating
to a violation of the West Virginia Uniform Controlled Substance Act."10
The court looked to the applicable statutes in affirming the defendant's conagency; however, if warranted, the court may require bail, except that bail may be denied
in any case where bail could be denied if the accused were an adult.
The judge of the circuit court or referee may, in conjunction with the detention hearing,
conduct a preliminary hearing pursuant to section nine [§ 49-5-9], article five of this chapter:
Provided, that all parties are prepared to proceed and the child has counsel during such hearing.
101Arbogast v. R.B.C., 301 S.E.2d 829 (W. Va. 1983).
Kearns v. Fox, 268 S.E.2d 65 (W. Va. 1980).
W. VA. CODE § 49-5-2 (1980).
W0$
106
307
303

Kinder, 317 S.E.2d at 155.
State v. Boggess, 309 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1983).
Id. at 120.

Id. at 120-21.
W' VA. CODE § 60A-1-101 to 60A-6-106 (1977 & Supp. 1984).
W.
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viction. West Virginia Code section 62-1A-3"I provides that those persons authorized
to execute search warrants include any other officer authorized by law. Section
20-7-4 2 and section 20-7-8"11 state that, in addition to the authority relating to
the Department of Natural Resources, conservation officers have the authority to
arrest any person committing a criminal offense in their presence.""
IX.

LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT: REQUISITE MENS REA

State v. Tennant, 319 S.E.2d 395 (W. Va. 1984)
In State v. Tennant," 5 the supreme court decided a person convicted of leaving the scene of an accident under West Virginia Code section 17C-4-1,"6 and section 17C-4-3,' '7 must know that he was in an accident, and, in addition, know
or have reason to know that injury resulted from such accident." 8 The defendant
and two passengers were involved in a single car accident after being forced off
the road by an oncoming car. Tennant said all he remembered was waking up on
a gravel road and going to the nearest lighted house to call his sister-in-law. When
she and the defendant arrived back at the scene of the accident, one of the passengers
was found dead, pinned under the wrecked car." 9 The defendant was arrested and
convicted of leaving the scene of an accident. On appeal, the defendant contended
that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the state must prove the defendant had knowledge of the accident and resulting injuries.' 20
The supreme court previously held in State v. Masters,'2' that an indictment
or an arrest warrant under the hit and run statute need not allege knowledge, because
this element was not made part of the language of such statutes. However, this
holding was questioned in Brumfield v. Wofford,'2 2 and consequently, was limited
to its facts. Neither Masters or Wofford addressed the issue of whether knowledge
of the accident and resulting injuries must be established to support a criminal
conviction of leaving the scene of an accident.'2 3
The court noted that a majority of jurisdictions having similarly worded hit
and run statutes have consistently held that knowledge of both the accident and

W. VA. CODE § 62-1A-3 (1977).

W12
V. VA. CODE § 20-7-4 (1981).
"W
"!

",

W. VA. CODE § 20-7-8 (1981).
Boggess, 309 S.E.2d at 124.
State v. Tennant, 319 S.E.2d 395 (V. Va. 1984).
W. VA. CODE 17c-4-1 (1974).
W1

W. VA. CODE 17c-4-3 (1974).
Tennant, 319 S.E.2d at 401.
", Id. at 397.
,20 Id. at 400-01.
121 State v. Masters, 106 W. Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718 (1928).
'2, Brumfield v. Wofford, 143 W. Va. 332, 102 S.E.2d 103 (1958).
,21 Tennant, 319 S.E.2d at 400.
'
'
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resulting injuries are implied in such statutes. 24 However, the court stated, "actual
knowledge" of the resulting injury is not required. It is sufficient to show that
the defendant should have reasonably anticipated that such an accident would result
in injury or death to another person.' 25 The court stated that to obtain a conviction
for leaving the scene of an accident, the state must establish knowledge of the accident and the resulting injury.12 6 Anything contrary in Masters was overruled.
Mark A. Colantonio

"" Id. at 400-01 (citing Touchstone v. State, 42 Ala. App. 141, 155 So. 2d 349 (1963); Kimoktoak

v. State, 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978); State v. Porras, 125 Ariz. 490, 610 P.2d 1051 (1980); People
v. Holford, 63 Cal. 2d 74, 403 P.2d 423, 45 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1965); Haire v. State, 155 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1963); State v. Parish, 79 Idaho 75, 310 P.2d 1082 (1957); People v. Nunn, 77 Ill.
2d 243, 396 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. 1979); State v. Miller, 308 N.W.2d 4 (Iowa 1981); State v. Fearing, 304
N.C. 471, 284 S.E.2d 487 (1981); State v. Corpuz, 49 Or. App. 811, 621 P.2d 604 (1980); Commonwealth
v. Kauffman, 470 A.2d 634 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); and State v. Szarek, 433 A.2d 193 (R.I. 1981);
Herchenbach v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 217, 38 S.E.2d 328 (1946)).
2I Tennant, 319 S.E.2d at 401.
126

Id.
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